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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
J. LOWELL PLATT, dba 
CRYSTAL POOLS, INC., 
Plaintiff a.nd Resp·ondent, 
-vs.-
C. L. LOCKE, 
Defendant ood Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9238 
Between the pretrial of May 13, 1959, in this matter 
and the trial herein, and at the suggestion of the trial 
court, appellant submitted to respondent a communica-
tion dated September 25, 1959, containing eighteen pro-
posed stipulations of fact. At the commencement of the 
trial the original of said letter was received by the court 
and filed (R. 122). This is the letter referred to by the court 
at the beginning of the trial (R. 29). It is necessary to 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
refer to the said proposed propositions to make sense of 
the judicial admissions of respondent. 
The formal judicial admissions of fact of respondent 
are as follows: 
1. That on or about April 1, 1958, the administrator 
acting under the direction and supervision of Commis-
sion of Business Regulation, and pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 58-23-5 (10), Laws of Utah 1957, had 
classified contractors building swimming pools into a 
specialty classification of contractors requiring a spe-
cialty contractors' license. That such classification was 
made and was effective prior to the first day of April, 
1958. (R.29,30,120) 
2. That on or before the 1st day of April, 1958, the 
plaintiff was engaged in the business of planning and 
building swimming pools. (R. 30, 120) 
3. That before Aprill, 1958, the defendant was con-
tacted by one Mr. Murdock, who represented that he was 
a sales agent for Crystal Pools, Inc., and the defendant 
and Murdock negotiated concerning the design and con-
struction of a commercial pool. That on or about Aprill, 
1958, the defendant Locke did sign the purported agree-
ment as shown by Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's 
complaint. (R. 30, 31, 120) 
4. That a dispute arose between defendant and plain-
tiff concerning whether -or not plaintiff was required to 
put in the water and gas lines; plaintiff refused and de-
fendant stopped the work on the pool. (R. 31, 121) 
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tJ. That on or about April 1, 1958, a builder's con-
tracting license had been issued to the plaintiff as an in-
dividual (R. 32, 121) 
6. That on or about April 1, 1958, no specialty con-
tractor's license had been issued to plaintiff. (R. 32, 121) 
7. That on or about April1, 1958, there was no such 
corporation in existence by the name of Crystal Pools, 
Inc. ( R. 32, 121) 
8. That on or about April 1, 1958, no contractor's 
license of any kind had been issued to any such entity by 
the name of Crystal Pools, Inc., nor had any contractor's 
license of any kind been issued in the name of Crystal 
Pools, Inc. (R. 32, 121) 
9. That on or about April 1, 1958, the plaintiff had 
filed no affidavit with the County Clerk of Salt Lake 
County of doing business under an assumed name. 
(R. 32, 121) 
10. That Mr. Joe Lamb is one of the persons in this 
area who is most experineced in the design and construc-
tion of swimming pools. (R. 34, 122) 
In addition to the foregoing judicial admissions or 
stipulated facts we find in the record that the respondent 
intended to incorporate but failed to do so (R. 18, 22), 
and that he executed the contract (Ex. P-1) in a repre-
sentative capacity, i. e., ''Crystal Pools, Inc., by J. Lowell 
Platt. (R. 19) 
It is significant in appellant's statement of facts that 
on 1\fay 13, 1958 (almost one and one-half months after the 
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contract in question had been executed) respondent ap-
plied for and received a specialty license to engage in the 
business activity of planning and constructing swimming 
pools. 
It is further significant in appellant's statement of 
facts that the only expert witness, Joe Lamb, testified that 
experience and skill are necessary to this occupation (R. 
48, 49); also that the record shows that appellant relied 
upon the fact that he was doing business with a proper 
and qualified corporate entity, Crystal Pools, Inc. (R. 
52), and such is admitted to be false. (R. 32, 121) 
On other factual issues on which there is disputed 
and contrary substantial evidence, appellant realizes that 
the trial court's finding (if such exist) are binding on 
this Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDG-
MENT FOR RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT FOR THE REASON THAT RESPOND-
ENT WAS NOT A PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND LI-
CENSED SPECIALTY CONTRACTOR AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
PoiNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION 
OF APPELLANT TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR DE-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FENDANT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SET ASIDE 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED HEREIN AND GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
PoiNT V. 
RESPONDENT WAS DOING BUSINESS UNDER 
AN ASSUMED NAME AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AND RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED 
CONTRACT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
PoiNT VI. 
AS THE CASE RESTED RESPONDENT FAILED 
TO PROVE ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND 
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED THE 
CONTRACT WAS MADE BY RESPONDENT AS AN 
AGENT FOR A NON-EXISTENT PRINCIPAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDG-
MENT FOR RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT FOR THE REASON THAT RESPOND-
ENT WAS NOT A PROPERLY QUALIFIED AND LI-
CENSED SPECIALTY CONTRACTOR AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
PoiNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
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PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MOTION 
OF APPELLANT TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR DE-
FENDANT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SET ASIDE 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED HEREIN AND GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The Legislature of the State of Utah, by the Laws of 
1957, passed the following laws of the State of Utah: 
'' 58-23-5. ADMINISTRATOR-POWERS AND DuTIES 
-EMPLOYEES - SEAL - MEETINGS - The adminis-
trator, acting under the direction and supervision 
of the commission of business regulation, and with 
the advice and counsel of the advisory board, is 
hereby charged with the responsibility of adminis-
tering this act, and for that purpose the adminis-
trator shall have the following powers and duties: 
* * * * * 
'' ( 10) To classify specialty contractors into 
separate classifications common in the trade and 
license each classification separately.'' 
''58-23-9. LICENSES- CLASSES- (1) Licenses 
issued under the provisions of this act shall be of 
the following classes : 
* * * * * 
''(b) GENERAL BuiLDING CoNTRACToR's LI-
CENSE. A general building contractor is a con-
tractor whose principal contracting business is in 
connection with any structure built, being built, or 
to be built for the support, shelter and enclosure of 
persons, animals, chattels or movable property of 
any kind requiring in its construction the use 
of more than two unrelated building trades or 
crafts or to do or superintend the whole or any 
part thereof, but does not include anyone who 
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merely furnishes materials or supplies without 
fabricating them into or consuming them in the 
performance of the work of the general building 
contractor. 
'' (c) SPECIALTY CoNTRACTOR's LicENSE. A spe-
cialty contractor is a contractor whose operations 
as such are the performance of construction work 
requiring special skill and whose principal con-
tracting business involves the use of specialized 
building trades or crafts. The administrator shall 
classify specialty contractors into such classifica-
tions as are common in the trade and a separate 
license shall be required for each such classifica-
tion of specialty contractor. 
* * * * 
"(3) Nothing in this act shall prohibit a spe-
cialty contractor from taking and executing a 
contract involving the use of two or more crafts 
or trades if the performance of the work in the 
crafts or trades other than those in which he is 
licensed is incidental and suppleme-ntal to the per-
formance of work in the craft for which the spe-
cialty contractor is licensed.'' 
That pursuant to the authority granted by said Sec-
tions 58-23-5 (10) and 58-23-9 (C-(2) and (3) ), the admin-
istrator of the department of contractors, appointed by 
the Department of Business Regulations, had classified 
contractors building swimming pools into a classification 
requiring a Specialty Contractor's License and that said 
classification was made and was effective prior to the 
first day of April, 1958. (R. 2, 3, 120) The failure to 
hold such a license is admitted by respondent, but he at-
tempts to justify his unlawful and void contract by the 
fact that, at the time, respondent held a General Build-
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ing Contractor's License defined by Sec. 58-23-9 (b), as 
follows: 
'' (b) GENERAL BuiLDING CoNTRACToR's LICENSE. 
A general building contractor is a contractor 
whose principal contracting business is in connec-
tion with any structure built, being built, or to be 
built for the support, shelter and enclosure of per-
sons, animals, chattels or movable property of 
any kind requiring in its construction the use of 
more than two unrelated building trades or crafts 
or to do or superintend the whole or any part 
thereof, but does not include anyone who merely 
furnishes materials or supplies without fabri-
cating them into or consuming them in the per-
formance of the work of the general building 
contractor.'' 
It is immediately apparent that a General Building 
Contractor's License is limited to specific structures for a 
specific purpose. This is a long cry from the problems in-
volved in planning and building swimming pools which 
involve many technical factors, including safety and 
sanitation. 
In spite of the admitted regulation of the adminis-
trator, acting under and pursuant to the authority of the 
Department of Business Regulations, the trial court, with-
out any evidence or record, decided that anyone could 
build a swimming pool and no specialty license was re-
quired. (R 71) The trial court held, in effect, that the 
administrator, by and through the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation, had no basis or authority for the spe-
cialty classification. The Court's attention is invited to 
the only evidence on this subject: 
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(Testimony of Mr. Lamb (R. 34), an admitted 
expert.) 
'' Q. Let me ask you this : Does it take any 
necessary or special skills to build a sw1mnnng 
pool~ 
''A. Well, I think so.'' 
The law ignored by the trial court is succinctly stated 
in American J ur., Vol. 42, at page 621 : 
''The court has nothing to do with the wisdom of 
expediency of the measures adopted by an admin-
istrative agency to which the formulation and exe-
cution of state policy has been intrusted, and must 
not substitute its judgment or notions of exped-
iency and fairness or wisdom for those which have 
guided such agency, even where the proof is con-
vincing that a different result would have been 
better. These are rna tters left by the legislature 
to the administrative 'tribunal appointed by law 
and informed by experience.' '' 
This court has uniformly followed this. doctrine. See 
Utah Labor Relations Board v. Broadway Shoe 
Repair Co., 120 Utah 585, 236 P. 2d 1072. 
Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Com., 116 Utah 443, 
211 Pac. 2d 200. 
Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Com., 
119 Utah 491, 229 Pac. 2d 675. 
Clayton v. Bennett, 3 Utah 2d 531, 298 Pac. 2d 
531. 
Bowline v. Gries (Cal.), 218 Pac. 2d 806. 
Franklin v. Na.t C. Goldstone Agency (Cal.) 204 
Pac. 2d 37. 
Fraenkel v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. 
Assn., (Cal.) 256 Pac. 2d 569. 
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It being admitted and established that respondent 
did not have the requisite license, we now look to the re-
sult of such failure. In Olsen v. Reese, ------ Utah ______ , 200 
Pac. 2d 733, this court said: 
''Contracts made by an unlicensed contractor 
when in violation of a statute passed for the pro-
tection of the public are held to be void and unen-
forceable. Our statute is so worded as to indi-
cate a legislative intent to protect the citizens from 
irresponsible contractors. The statute, while not 
comprehensive, provides for a small license fee. 
Control over the contractor is given to the De-
partment of Registration. Upon an appropriate 
hearing, the department may, for unprofessional 
conduct, suspend or cancel the license. Good repu-
tation and integrity are essential to obtaining a 
license and the entire object of the statute is pro-
tection of the public against fraudulent and illegal 
practice, which have always been recognized as a 
distinct characteristic of statutes, which are not 
mere revenue measures. The statute being en-
acted for the protection of the public, plaintiff's 
written contract is void unless it is competent 
and permissible for him to establish that the date 
when it was actually executed and delivered was 
later than the date of execution shown in the 
contract.'' 
Also, in the case of Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Utah 521 
211 Pac. 2d 849: 
''Neither the pleadings nor the findings of fact 
include any statement that plaintiff nor Empey 
was licensed as a contractor by the State of Utah, 
as required by Section 79-5a-1, U.C.A. 1943 
which reads : 
" 'It shall be unla,v"ful for any person, firm, co-
10 
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partnership, corporation, association, or other 
organization, or any combination of any thereof, 
to engage in the business or act in the capacity of 
contractor within this state without having a li-
cense therefor as herein provided, unless such per-
son, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, 
or other organization is particularly exempted as 
provided in this act. ' 
''Recently this court has had occasion to pass 
upon the necessity of such a license and held, Olsen 
v. Reese, Utah 1948, 200 P. 2d 733, that the pos-
session of such a license is a necessary allegation 
in the pleadings ; and that such a contract entered 
into without a license is void. 
"Defendant demurred to plaintiff's complaint 
as not stating a cause of action. The demurrer 
should have been sustained. Plaintiff, however, 
contends that this error in the complaint was not 
called to the attention of the lower court, but was 
raised for the first time in this court. Quite aside 
from the fact that a failure to state a cause of 
action is an objection that may be raised at any 
time, the findings of fact on their face show the 
judgment is void for lack of a finding that plain-
tiff has such a license, and the testimony in the 
case is to the effect that plaintiff did not have a 
license. 
''Plaintiff contends that Empey as his agent 
had a license, but, under plaintiff's theory, Empey 
was not the responsible party, the contractor; and 
such fact, if true, would not relieve the contractor 
from the requirements of the statute. 
''We are of the opinion that the case cited 
above is decisive of this case. The judgment of 
the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded 
with directions to the lower court to dismiss the 
action.'' 
11 
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Only a year a.go, this court in the case of Chase v. 
Morgarn, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 Pa.c. 2d 1019, held that an 
unlicensed real estate broker was not entitled to recover, 
even though a Justice (concurring) asserted that ''As to 
good conscience, this case was disturbing.'' 
PoiNT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Immediately upon the filing of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law appellant moved to amend and 
supplement the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
(R. 106-107) The motion to amend was based upon the 
initial admission that the respondent at the time of the 
contracting held only a general builders' contractor's li-
cense. The court refused to incorporate this material alle-
gation in its findings of fact. Appellant further moved the 
making of additional findings of fact as follows: 
"(a) That on or about April 1, 1958, the ad-
ministrator acting under the direction and super-
vision of Commission of Business Regulation, and 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 58-23-5 (10), 
Laws of Utah 1957, had classified contractors 
building swimming pools into a specialty classifi-
ac.tion of contractors requiring a specialty con-
tractors license. That such classification "~as made 
and \vas effectiv·e prior to the first day of ..L:\._pril, 
1958. 
''(b) That on or before the 1st day of April, 
1958, the plaintiff \vas engaged in the business of 
planning and building s\-rimming pools. 
12 
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'' (c) That before April1, 1958, the defendant 
was contacted by one Mr. Murdock, who represent-
ed that he was a sales agent for Crystal Pools, 
Inc., and the defendant and Murdock negotiated 
concerning the design and construction of a com-
mercial pool. That on or about April 1, 1958, the 
defendant Locke did sign the purported agreement 
as shown by Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's 
complaint. 
'' (d) That on or about April 1, 1958, no spe-
cialty contractors' license had been issued to 
plaintiff. 
'' (e) That on or about April 1, 1958, there 
was no such corporation in existence by the name 
of Crystal Pools, Inc. 
"(f) That on or about April 1, 1958, no con-
tractor's license of any kind had been issued to any 
such entity by the name of Crystal Pools, Inc., 
nor had any contractor's license of any kind been 
issued in the name of Crystal Pools, Inc. 
"(g) That on or about April1, 1958, the plain-
tiff had filed no affidavit with the County Clerk of 
Salt Lake County of doing business under an as-
sumed name." (R. 106-107) 
This was refused. These were facts which were the 
subject of judicial admission in this case, which has here-
tofore been discussed in the statement of facts and were 
material to a decision by the trial court. 
PoiNT V. 
RESPONDENT WAS DOING BUSINESS UNDER 
AN ASSUMED NAME AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, UTAH CODE 
13 
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ANNOTATED 1953 AND RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED 
CONTRACT IS VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE. 
The respondent was doing business under an assumed 
name and failed to comply with the provisions of Section 
42-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and respondent's 
alleged contract is unenforceable. 
Section 42-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as 
follows: 
''Affidavit of assumed and of true name--Fil-
ing. - No person or persons shall carry on or 
conduct or tra,nsact business in this state under an 
as~umed name, or under any designation, name 
or style, corporate, partnership or otherwise, other 
than the real name or names of the individual or 
individuals conducting or transacting such busi-
ness, unless such person or persons shall file in 
the office of the county clerk of the county in which 
the principal place of business is, or is to be, lo-
cated, an affidavit setting forth the name under 
which such business is, or is to be, conducted or 
transacted, and the true full name or names of the 
person or persons owning, conducting or transact-
ing the same, the location of the principal place of 
business, with the postoffice address or addresses 
of such person or persons. Such affidavit shall be 
executed by the person or persons so conducting or 
intending to conduct such business.'' (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Appellant is familiar 'vith the fact that the majority 
view entertained by the courts is that the legislature did 
not intend to impose a penalty on the offender of refusing 
him relief on contracts or transactions without com-
pliance. However, these general text statements are made 
without reference to the language of the statutes of the 
14 
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various states. The language of the Utah statute is ex-
tremerly forceable and demanding - ''No person shall 
carry on or conduct business * * *." 
This Court apparently had reservations on this sub-
ject. In the case of Green v. Nelson, 120 Utah 155, 232 
Pac. 2d 776, Justice Wolfe, who, after holding the statute 
inapplicable for other reasons, stated: 
"Holding as we do that section 58-2-1, U. C. A. 
1943, has no application to a person doing busi-
ness in this state under an assumed name but hav-
ing no place of business here, it is unnecessary for 
us to here express any opinion whether the failure 
to comply with that section, when applicable, ren-
ders a contract made by a partnership in its as-
sumed name unenforceable in the courts of this 
state.'' 
This is now the case where this Court should squarely 
face the language and demands of the Legislature in a 
definite opinion. 
PoiNT VI. 
AS THE CASE RESTED RESPONDENT FAILED 
TO PROVE ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND 
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED THE 
CONTRACT WAS MADE BY RESPONDENT AS AN 
AGENT FOR A NON-EXISTENT PRINCIPAL. 
An examination of Exhibit P-1 shows that the con-
tract was made on behalf of Crystal Pools, Inc., and was 
executed in a representative capacity by respondent, i. e., 
CRYSTAL POOLS, INC. 
By J. Lowell Platt 
N arne and Title 
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The final paragraph of Exhibit P-1 states: ''This 
contract is not binding upon Crystal Pools, Inc., until the 
original is accepted in writing by an officer or general 
manager thereof.'' Appellant is conscious of the fact 
that the respondent testified that Mr. Locks knew that it 
was not incorporated for the reason that he had informed 
Mr. Locke. (R. 19) There was no evidence, however, as 
to when and under what circumstances this information 
was given to Mr. Locke. The interesting factor is that 
the trial judge paid no attention to this evidence and 
erroneously held that Platt would have been bound on 
the contract because he was an agent for a non-existent 
principal, and therefore Locke was bound, and that Locke 
could not have relied upon a corporation not in existence 
because it had no reputation and had only been in exis-
tence in contemplation of mind for two months or less 
(R. 71-72). The trial court made no finding that Locke was 
informed of the non-existence of the corporation prior to 
the execution of the contract. 
Section 369 of Restatement of the Law of Agency, 
Second, reads as follows : · 
''AGENT WHo HAs AcTED WITHOUT AuTHORITY 
-A person who, without power to do so, purports 
to bind a disclosed or partially disclosed principal 
as a party to a contract cannot, eYen though he is 
a party thereto and offers to perform it, maintain 
an action thereon against the other party to it, 
unless the purported principal ratifies it.'' 
It appears to appellant that if an agent without au-
thority makes a contract with a disclosed principal, and 
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nence he cannot maintain an action thereon without rati-
fication, that it necessarily follows that an agent who pur-
ports to make a contract on behalf of a non-e:xistent prin-
cipal can be in no better position. The Court will note 
that Exhibit P-1 is an unambiguous, integrated con-
tract. Under the circumstances presented in this case the 
respondent is now estopped from denying the existence of 
''Crystal Pools,'' Inc.,'' which he dealt with as a cor-
poration. 
Cavaness v. General Corporation, (Tex.) 272 S.W. 
2d 595, 602, affirmed, 283 S.W. 2d 33. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court ignored the previous 
announcements of this court concerning the necessity of 
holding appropri'ate license when the public interest is 
involved, and the court arbitrarily substituted its judg-
ment for an administrative agency. The law is well found-
ed in the State of Utah on the subjects involved, and 
appellant urges that such prior announcements cannot be 
disregarded. 
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in the 
various rulings and acts set forth under the points herein 
presented and argued. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
Attorneys for Appellant 
307 Utah Oil Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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